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ABSTRACT: The costs and risks associated with America’s military
alliances have always been more visible and easily understood than
the benefits. In reality, however, those costs and risks are frequently
overstated, whereas the benefits are more numerous and significant
than often appreciated. This article offers a more accurate net
assessment of America’s alliances in hopes of better informing
current policy debates.

P

resident Donald Trump has shaken up the foreign policy debate
in the United States, and nowhere more so than in relations
with America’s longstanding treaty allies. Since Trump emerged
as a presidential candidate in mid-2015, he has often put US alliances
squarely in his crosshairs. Trump labeled the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) “obsolete” and suggested leaving its easternmost
members to defend themselves. He floated the idea of encouraging
nuclear proliferation by Japan and South Korea to enable US geopolitical
retrenchment. As president, Trump pointedly refused to explicitly affirm
America’s Article 5 commitment at his first NATO summit, and he
publicly dressed down the European allies for failing to spend more
on defense.1
In a subsequent trip to Europe, Trump offered a more robust
statement of US commitment to NATO, but nonetheless vented
his frustration with allies for not, in his view, shouldering sufficient
burdens.2 Underlying these critiques has been the idea that US alliances
are fundamentally sucker bets—one-sided relationships in which a
guileless America bears all the costs and parasitic allies derive all the
benefits. “We’re taken advantage by every nation in the world virtually,”
Trump commented in February 2017.3
Not surprisingly, the bipartisan US foreign policy elite has generally
reacted with alarm at the administration’s rhetoric and policies. Leading
commentators have warned that Trump is threatening to harm the
alliances Washington spent decades building, institutions generally
considered to be among America’s most precious geopolitical assets.4
Likewise, international observers have worried that the United States
1      See, variously, Aaron Eglitis, Toluse Olorunnipa, and Andy Sharp, “Trump’s NATO
Skepticism Raises Alarm for Allies Near Russia,” Bloomberg, July 21, 2016; Stephanie Condon,
“Donald Trump: Japan, South Korea Might Need Nuclear Weapons,” CBS News, March 29, 2016;
and Jeremy Diamond, “Trump Scolds NATO Allies over Defense Spending,” CNN, May 25, 2017.
2      Abby Phillip and John Wagner, “In Poland, Trump Reaffirms Commitment to NATO, Chides
Russia,” Daily Herald (Chicago), July 6, 2017.
3      Lauren Gambino and Sabrina Siddiqui, “Trump Defends Chaotic Foreign Policy: ‘We’re
Going to Straighten It Out, OK?’,” Guardian, February 2, 2017.
4      See, for instance, Dov Zakheim, “Trump’s Position on Treaty Commitments Has Already
Hurt America,” Foreign Policy, July 22, 2016.
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seems to be turning away from its most important friends.5 Yet despite
the reaction they have provoked, Trump’s critiques have nonetheless
revealed a fundamental asymmetry in the cost-benefit assessment
of US alliances.
The fact of the matter is that the costs and risks associated with
America’s alliances have always been more visible and easily understood
than the benefits. Moreover, because US foreign policy elites have
long become accustomed to military alliances as facts of geopolitical
life, even proalliance observers often struggle to specify, in concrete
terms, why those institutions are so valuable. Supporters are thus at a
rhetorical disadvantage in these arguments. They often defend alliances
by pointing to vague and ill-defined benefits, or simply by invoking
tradition, whereas critics can point to specific dangers and burdens,
including those more easily reduced to a campaign trail slogan or a pithy
tweet. And Trump is not alone in his attacks on US alliances—many
leading “realist” academics have long offered similar critiques, which
the president has now effectively appropriated as his own. “The U.S.
net gain from its alliance relationships is . . . not commensurate with the
cost,” Barry Posen writes: “the bargain has become unprofitable to the
United States.”6
In this essay, we offer a more accurate net assessment of America’s
alliances by detailing the purported costs and considerable—if less
widely understood—benefits. We first summarize the most common
critiques of US alliances and explain why many of those critiques are less
persuasive than they initially seem. We then provide a detailed typology
of the myriad benefits—military and otherwise—of US alliances. As this
analysis shows, the net assessment of US alliances is strongly positive,
and the balance is not even particularly close. Today as always, there
remain significant challenges associated with alliance management and
reasonable debates to be had about addressing them. But those debates
need to be informed by a better understanding of what US alliances are
good for in the first place.

Costs, Real and Perceived

Trump is not the first prominent observer to critique US alliances.
Ever since the country’s founding, permanent military alliances have
been a source of controversy. The alliance structure built from the ashes
of World War II, and gradually expanded in the decades thereafter, has
itself been the subject of heated debate. Leading political figures such
as Senator Robert Taft initially opposed an American commitment to
NATO; Senator Michael Mansfield sought to force withdrawal of half
the US troops deployed to Europe in the early 1970s. The post-Cold
War expansion of NATO touched off perhaps the most intense foreign
policy debate of the 1990s. And in recent decades, there has been a lively
cottage industry among academics who deem US alliances expensive,
unrewarding, and dangerous, and who argue for attenuating or simply
abandoning those commitments. The standard academic critique—much
5      Krishnadev Calamur, “Germany’s Merkel Urges ‘Europe to Take Our Fate into Our Own
Hands,’ ” Atlantic, May 30, 2017.
6      Barry R. Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2014), 34.
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of which Trump has adopted or adapted as his own—adduces several
key costs and dangers associated with US alliances.
First, America’s military alliances require Washington to defend
countries whose security is not vital to the United States. Second, US
alliances compel military expenditures far higher than would be necessary
simply to defend America itself. Third, maintaining the credibility of US
alliances forces America to adopt aggressive, forward-leaning defense
strategies. Fourth, having allies raises the risk of the United States
being entrapped in unwanted conflicts. Fifth, America’s allies habitually
free ride on America’s own exertions. Sixth, alliances limit America’s
freedom of action and cause unending diplomatic headaches.7
So how accurate are these critiques? We consider each in its turn.
In sum, America’s alliance system is hardly costless, and all of these
critiques contain at least a kernel of truth. In many cases, however, the
costs are significantly exaggerated—or critics simply ignore that the
United States would have to pay similar costs even if it had no alliances.
Alliances require defending countries whose security is not vital to the United
States. The United States has formal security commitments to over thirty
treaty allies in Europe and the Asia-Pacific and informal or ambiguous
security commitments to over thirty additional countries.8 These
commitments, particularly the formal treaty commitments, represent
something approaching a solemn vow to shed blood to defend nonAmerican lands. And some of the countries protected by US guarantees
are not, in and of themselves, critical to the global balance of power or
the physical security of the United States.9 The United States could be
called upon to resist a Russian seizure of Estonia, and yet the American
people could survive and thrive in a world in which Estonia was occupied
by Russian forces.
Yet if this critique is not baseless, it is often overstated, because the
United States does have a vital interest in defending many of its current
allies. The basic geopolitical lesson of World Wars I and II—a lesson
many critics of US alliances endorse—is that Washington should not
allow any hostile power to dominate a crucial geopolitical region such as
Europe, East Asia, or the Middle East.10 Accordingly, the United States
could still find itself compelled to fight to defend those regions—and
7      For examples of these critiques, see Posen, Restraint; Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions:
American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006); Stephen
M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York: Norton, 2006);
Christopher A. Preble, The Power Problem: How American Military Dominance Makes Us Less Safe, Less
Prosperous, and Less Free (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009); Eric A. Nordlinger, Isolationism
Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy for a New Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995);
and Ted Galen Carpenter, A Search for Enemies: America’s Alliances after the Cold War (Washington,
DC: Cato Institute, 1992). Some of these works build on earlier (and often less critical) studies of
alliance dynamics, including Mancur Olson Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of
Alliances,” Review of Economics and Statistics 48, 3 (August 1996): 266–79, doi:10.2307/1927082; and
Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).
8      See Adam Taylor, “Map: The U.S. Is Bound by Treaties to Defend a Quarter of Humanity,”
Washington Post, May 30, 2015. A precise count of US allies is difficult to achieve because the actual meaning and implications of certain US defense agreements—the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance, for instance—are ambiguous.
9      It is important to note that all of America’s defense commitments provide an “out” through
clauses allowing Washington to act in accordance with its own constitutional processes. In essence,
treaties—although they are ratified by the Senate and carry the force of law—represent more of a
moral obligation than a tightly binding legal obligation to other states.
10      See John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior
U.S. Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 95, 4 (July/August 2016): 70–83.
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many key countries therein—even if formal alliance relationships did
not exist. This was, after all, precisely what happened during both world
wars and the Persian Gulf War, when American officials concluded
that US security required defending or liberating key countries in these
regions, even though Washington had not previously had military
alliances there. Alliances do not cause US entanglements overseas;
entanglements cause alliances.
US alliances compel military expenditures far higher than would be necessary
to defend America itself. To defend allies in the western Pacific or Europe,
the United States requires global power-projection capabilities and a
military that can win not just in its own backyard but in the backyards of
its great-power rivals. America thus needs a larger, more technologically
advanced, more sophisticated force than would be necessary strictly for
continental defense, along with an accompanying global-basing network.
For these reasons, the US military is indeed more expensive than it
would be absent US alliances. Yet this critique is also overblown. After
all, if the United States has an interest in preventing any hostile power
from dominating a key region of Eurasia, then alliances or no alliances,
Washington would still require a military capable of projecting decisive
power into these regions in an emergency.11 Likewise, because America
has geopolitical objectives beyond the protection of allies—such as
counterterrorism and securing the global commons—the need for
advanced power projection capabilities and overseas bases would remain
even in a world without alliances.
Such a force might still be smaller than today’s military. If the
United States pursued a strategy in which it rolled back or attenuated
key alliances, one critic suggests, it could reduce defense spending to
2.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), as opposed to 3.5 or 4
percent.12 Yet America would still have the world’s largest defense budget
by a considerable margin under this approach, and such a force—which
would consist, for instance, of only four carrier strike groups instead of
10 to 11 today—might not actually be sufficient to command the global
commons and fight its way back into key regions in a crisis.13
In fact, if the United States pulled back from its alliance commitments
and waited for a crisis to develop before surging back into key regions,
it might find such a mission more difficult—and more expensive—
than simply protecting its allies in the first place. It was precisely this
fact—that the United States ended up deploying millions of troops to
liberate Western Europe and East Asia during World War II, at financial
and human costs that would be almost unimaginable today, that led
American policymakers to adopt a different approach featuring formal
alliances and forward deployments thereafter.14 Nor would eliminating
parts of the US basing network associated with protecting American
11      Evan Braden Montgomery, “Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific: China’s Rise and
the Future of U.S. Power Projection,” International Security 38, no. 4 (Spring 2014): 121, doi:10.1162
/ISEC_a_00160.
12      Posen, Restraint.
13      Hal Brands, The Limits of Offshore Balancing (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,
2015), 23–28.
14      See Robert J. Art, A Grand Strategy for America (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003),
205; and James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “An Ocean Too Far: Offshore Balancing in the
Indian Ocean,” Asian Security 8, 1 (March 2012): 11, doi:10.1080/14799855.2011.652025.
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allies save much money absent corresponding force reductions, because
host-nation support arrangements often make it roughly as cheap, if not
cheaper, to station American forces overseas than to station them in the
United States.15 American defense expenditures could slightly decrease
in a world without US military alliances, at least in the short-term, but
the savings would be less dramatic—and perhaps more ephemeral—
than one might expect.
Maintaining the credibility of American alliances requires adopting forwardleaning defense strategies. This critique comes closer to the mark. Prior to
the Cold War, the US strategic posture was essentially one of allowing
aggressors to conquer friendly states in Europe and East Asia, and then
mobilizing to liberate those areas. Since the late 1940s, however, US
policymakers have worried that American allies will be unlikely to risk
aligning with Washington—and thereby antagonizing hostile neighbors
such as the Soviet Union—if they believe the United States will simply
allow them to be overrun in a conflict. If being liberated first requires
being conquered, who wants to be liberated?16
Accordingly, since the early Cold War, the United States has focused
on defending rather than liberating allies. This strategy required
Washington to pledge to defend West Germany at the Rhine despite
the enormous difficulty of doing so, to forward-station forces in
Europe and East Asia, and even to pledge rapid nuclear escalation to
defend vulnerable European allies.17 Since the end of the Cold War, the
dilemmas associated with forward defense have been far less dangerous
and agonizing because the United States has not confronted a rival
superpower. But the return of great-power competition in recent years
has begun to raise these issues anew, albeit in less dramatic fashion. Part
of the rationale for the Pentagon’s much-hyped Air-Sea Battle concept
appears to be to cripple China’s power-projection capabilities before it
can subdue US allies in the Western Pacific.18 The recent stationing of
US and NATO battalions in the Baltic states—in some cases, less than
200 miles from major Russian cities such as St. Petersburg—reflects
similar imperatives.
Having allies raises the risk of entrapment. Critics of US alliances point to
the danger of “reckless driving” and “chain-ganging.” Reckless driving
occurs when an ally, protected by a US security guarantee, behaves more
provocatively than would otherwise be prudent. Reckless driving, in
turn, can trigger chain-ganging. If an ally intentionally or unintentionally
triggers conflict with an adversary, a formal security commitment may
force the guarantor to enter the conflict whether it desires to or not.
There is some irreducible danger of reckless driving and chain-ganging
in any credible alliance, of course. Yet historical evidence suggests that
this problem is actually less severe in US alliances than one might expect.
15      See Patrick Mills et al, The Costs of Commitment: Cost Analysis of Overseas Air Force Basing (working paper, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, April 2012).
16      On this dynamic, see Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, The Truman
Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992).
17      Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).
18      On AirSea Battle (now called the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global
Commons), see Andrew F. Krepinevich, Why AirSea Battle? (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic
and Budgetary Assessments, 2010).
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As Michael Beckley and Victor Cha have shown, US policymakers
have long been sensitive to this dilemma, and have thus inserted
loopholes or escape hatches into security agreements with potentially
problematic partners, such as Syngman Rhee’s South Korea or Chiang
Kai-Shek’s Taiwan.19 Today, for instance, the US security commitment
to Taiwan is ambiguous for this very purpose: to prevent Taipei from
assuming Washington will automatically rescue Taiwan if its leaders
provoke China. NATO forbids new members from having outstanding
territorial disputes for the same reason.
In recent decades, moreover, the United States has repeatedly
pressured allies and security partners to behave with restraint and
warned those allies against provoking stronger neighbors. American
officials underscored this point in dealings with Taiwan during the
George W. Bush administration, and reportedly, with the Philippines
and other allies in their more recent maritime disputes with China.20
As a result, scholars have found few, if any, unambiguous cases over
the past 70 years in which the United States was dragged into shooting
wars solely because of alliance commitments.21 Reckless driving and
chain-ganging are risks, but US officials have so far proven fairly adept
at managing them.
Allies habitually free ride. The opposite of reckless driving and chain
ganging is free-riding. Logically, because America is committed to
defend its allies, those states can spend less than they would otherwise
on their own defense. In 2011, for instance, the United States spent
around 4.5 percent of its GDP on defense, compared to 1.6 percent of
GDP for European NATO allies and roughly 1 percent for Japan.22
To be fair, these statistics exaggerate the free-riding problem because
America’s defense budget includes higher-than-average personnel costs
as a way of recruiting and retaining an all-volunteer force in contrast to
many allies and partners whose labor markets enable them to recruit
personnel at lower wages or who rely primarily on conscription.23
Moreover, this gap was subsequently narrowed as US military spending,
which had been inflated by the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, fell after
2010. Yet free-riding is nonetheless real enough, as US officials have
frankly recognized. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told NATO
in 2011, “The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and
patience in the U.S. Congress—and in the American body politic writ
large—to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that
are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make
the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own
defense.”24Indeed, this problem has troubling implications, for it renders
19      Michael Beckley, “The Myth of Entangling Alliances: Reassessing the Security Risks of
U.S. Defense Pacts,” International Security 39, 4 (Spring 2015): 7–48, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00197; and
Victor Cha, Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2016).
20      Thomas J. Christensen, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power (New York:
W. W. Norton, 2015), chapter 7. See also Ja Ian Chong and Todd R. Hall, “The Lessons of 1914 for
East Asia Today: Missing the Trees for the Forest,” International Security 39, 1 (Summer 2014): 23–24,
doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00165.
21      Beckley, “Myth of Entangling Alliances.”
22      Posen, Restraint, 35–36.
23      Lindsay P. Cohn, “How Much is Enough?,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 9, no. 3 (Fall 2015): 47–61.
24      Thom Shanker and Steven Erlanger, “Blunt U.S. Warning Reveals Deep Strains in NATO,”
New York Times, June 10, 2011.
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the allies less capable of contributing to either out-of-area interventions
or collective defense operations.
If free-riding is indeed a dilemma, however, it is also an implicit
goal of US alliances, and it probably costs less—when “cost” is defined
holistically—than the likely alternatives. As extensive scholarship
demonstrates, a primary reason Washington created its postwar military
alliances was to break the cycle of unrestrained geopolitical competition
in Europe and East Asia, for fear such competition would give rise
to arms races and wars. Moreover, another prominent goal of US
alliances has been to restrain nuclear proliferation, for fear the spread
of nuclear weapons would make nuclear war more likely and dilute
American influence.25
In other words, some degree of free-riding is a feature of America’s
alliances, not a glitch. The United States has traditionally preferred
for allies to spend less on defense than they otherwise might, because
this restraint creates a world in which America itself is safer and more
influential. To put it another way, does Washington really want a world in
which Germany and Japan both spend 5 percent of GDP on defense and
engage in nuclear arms-racing with adversaries? The answer is surely no,
even if US officials might still urge these countries to spend moderately
more than they do today.
Alliances limit America’s freedom of action and cause unending diplomatic
headaches. This is true enough. In international politics, it can be harder
to do things multilaterally than unilaterally. In many cases, relying on
allies means relying on less capable military forces to perform functions
the US military could better perform on its own, as Washington
discovered during the intervention in Kosovo in the late 1990s. Allies
bring their own idiosyncrasies into the relationship, often with messy
and frustrating results. A vivid example of this dynamic was the set
of caveats each NATO ally brought to the mission in Afghanistan—
restrictions on when, where, and how its forces could fight—ensuring
that, in terms of combat punch, the whole was somewhat less than the
sum of the parts.26
Making alliances work also requires continual “gardening,” in the
phrase of George Shultz—continually massaging difficult relationships
and suffering insufferable allies such as Charles de Gaulle. As Jimmy
Carter once remarked, a meeting with allies represented “one of the
worst days of my diplomatic life.”27 Yet there are obvious counterpoints
here: frustrations are inherent in any diplomatic relationship, the United
States undoubtedly finds it easier to address those frustrations within the
context of deeply institutionalized alliances, and any constraints on US
freedom of action have to be weighed against the myriad other ways in
which alliances enhance US flexibility and power.

25      See Francis Gavin, “Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and
Nonproliferation” International Security 40, no. 1 (Summer 2015): 9–46, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00205;
and Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, America Abroad: The United States’ Global Role in the
21st Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 88–121.
26      Seth Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan (New York: W. W. Norton,
2009), 238–55.
27      Hal Brands, Making the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War Order
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016), 24.
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Overall, the costs and frustrations of US alliances are not illusory,
but many of those costs are actually less severe or salient than they
appear. The benefits of US alliances, by contrast, are both more diverse
and more significant than often appreciated.

Benefits, Direct and Indirect

Just as critics overstate the costs of alliances, so they dramatically
understate the benefits. The most direct and obvious advantages involve
the way allies allow the United States to punch above its own weight
by augmenting US military strengths across a range of issues and
contingencies. Yet alliances also offer additional geostrategic, politicaldiplomatic, and economic advantages that enhance American power
and support a number of critical US national objectives. In other words,
America’s alliances are less entangling than empowering. By binding
itself to the defense of like-minded nations, the world’s sole superpower
makes itself all the more effective and influential.

Military Punching Power

First and foremost, having allies significantly increases the military
power the United States can bring to bear on a given battlefield. During
the Cold War, European forces were vital to maintaining something
approximating a balance of power vis-à-vis Warsaw Pact forces.28 NATO
countries and other treaty allies also contributed to nearly every major
US combat operation of the postwar era, even though nearly all of those
operations occurred “out of area.” The United States may have waged
the Korean War in part to prove its willingness to defend its treaty allies
in Europe, but the NATO allies contributed over 20,000 troops—in
addition to other capabilities—to the fight.29 Even during the Vietnam
War, treaty allies South Korea and Australia contributed substantial
fighting elements (and bore substantial casualties); South Korea sent
over 300,000 soldiers to Vietnam over the course of the conflict and lost
over 4,500 in combat.30 Virtually everywhere the United States fought
during the Cold War, it did so in the company of allies.
In the post-Cold War era, this benefit has sometimes seemed less
important, because of the vast margin of US dominance vis-à-vis its rivals,
and because the gap between what Washington could do militarily and
what even its most capable allies could do militarily widened markedly.
Yet even so, the United States has relied heavily on allied participation
in nearly all of its major interventions.
During the Persian Gulf War, key NATO allies such as France and
the United Kingdom made large contributions to the coalition effort,
with the British providing 43,000 troops along with significant air
and naval contingents. The NATO allies provided roughly half of the
60,000 troops who policed Bosnia as part of the Implementation Force
mission in that country from 1995 through 1996, and a majority of the
31,000 troops who made up the subsequent Stabilization Force. NATO
28      See Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace; and Leffler, Preponderance of Power, 385–90.
29      The number may well have been higher; 20,000 seems like a rough and conservative estimate.
For general information, see Paul M. Edwards, United Nations Participants in the Korean War: The
Contributions of 45 Member Countries (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2013).
30      James Sterngold, “South Korea’s Vietnam Veterans Begin to Be Heard,” New York Times,
May 10, 1992.
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contributions to the US-led war in Afghanistan peaked at around 40,000
troops; this contingent helped sustain the mission at a time of heavy
US focus on Iraq and made it possible for Washington to surge 30,000
additional troops into Iraq when its forces were strained to the limit.31
Other US wars—in Iraq, Libya, and against the Islamic State—have
also featured noteworthy contributions from treaty allies in Europe and
the Asia-Pacific region. Both critics and defenders of US alliances often
speak of the frustrations of unequal burden sharing. But America’s
military burdens would be much higher if it did not have allies willing
to share them.
Having formal allies as opposed to relying on ad hoc partnerships
also yields a second and related military benefit: it eases the process of
mobilizing cobelligerents for action in a crisis. It is possible to assemble
military coalitions on the fly, of course, and every coalition military
venture in which the United States participated prior to 1945 was in
some sense improvised. Moreover, even in the post-World War II era,
the United States has solicited ad hoc contributions from nonallied
partner states. It is even possible, as the United States has repeatedly
demonstrated, to make a purely transactional alliance of convenience
with a “devil”—a country that otherwise shares very few interests
with America, such as the Soviet Union in World War II or Syria in the
Persian Gulf War.
The possibility of improvising military cooperation when needed
has led some critics to argue the United States can do away with formal,
institutionalized alliances altogether.32 But turning every military
operation into the equivalent of pickup basketball greatly increases the
difficulty of building an effective combined force. Pushing the analogy
further, pickup basketball is very hard to arrange in the absence of longstanding arrangements and customs that increase the predictability of the
other actors. Economists refer to these difficulties as transaction costs;
the routines and institutionalization of formal alliances make it much
easier to bring military power to bear at much lower transaction costs.
In formal alliances, the partners practice together in peacetime,
develop interoperability, and may even develop common equipment, thus
easing logistics challenges. They also establish diplomatic forums and
longstanding, fairly predictable relationships, thereby making it easier to
coordinate interests and achieve the political consensus necessary to use
force in the first place.33 To be sure, everything could be negotiated on
the fly, but the price America would pay for this flexibility would be the
31      See Hal Brands, Dealing with Allies in Decline: Alliance Management and U.S. Strategy in an Era of
Global Power Shifts (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2017), 9–10;
Spencer C. Tucker and Priscilla Mary Roberts, eds., The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars: The United
States in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Conflicts (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2010), 214;
“Peace Support Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” NATO, September 7, 2015, www.nato.int
/cps/en/natolive/topics_52122.htm; and Jones, Graveyard of Empires, 243–45.
32      Benjamin Schwarz and Christopher Layne, “A New Grand Strategy,” Atlantic, January 2002,
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2002/01/a-new-grand-strategy/376471/.
33      Both the advantages and limits of these practices are discussed in David P. Auerswald and
Stephen M. Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2014). Seth Johnston argues that institutionalization also facilitates NATO’s adaption and innovation, keeping NATO relevant and useful long after its original purpose had been
eclipsed. Seth A. Johnston, How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance since
1950 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017).
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significantly greater difficulty—and, most likely, the significantly longer
timelines—of piecing together a coalition in a crisis.
A third major military contribution of allies is the specialized
capability they can bring to the table. Sometimes this is material
capability: British, French, and Australian special operations forces have
all made vital contributions to the Global War on Terror. The Japanese
have some of the finest antisubmarine warfare capabilities in the world,
which would be essential in a US conflict with China.34 More often US
allies contribute geographical capability in the form of proximity to the
theater of interest. This proximity allows forward staging of the strike
and intelligence assets, particularly air assets, on which the American
way of war depends. It also allows for specialized technical intelligence
collection that would be nearly impossible to conduct without local
partners. The counter-ISIS campaign, for instance, would have been
vastly more difficult had the United States not had access to key facilities
controlled by either treaty allies (Turkey) or long-standing military
partners (Qatar or Bahrain).35 Similarly, the United States would face
a nearly impossible task in any North Korean contingency without the
extensive US basing network in Japan.
And, of course, the United States has also traditionally relied on
another allied contribution: intellectual capability. By virtue of their
history, US allies have unique networks of relationships, along with the
distinctive insights those relationships afford, in many regions of interest.
This translates into intelligence—particularly human intelligence—that
would be almost impossible for America to generate on its own; consider,
for instance, the intelligence advantages possessed by the French in
northwest Africa or the Italians in Libya.36
The existence of formal, deeply institutionalized alliances, in
turn, facilitates the sharing of such intelligence. Three out of the four
countries that make up the Five Eyes intelligence partnership with the
United States are longstanding treaty allies; Washington also cooperates
extensively with its NATO allies on intelligence matters.37 In this as in
other respects, America’s alliances make it far stronger and more capable
militarily than it would otherwise be.

Geostrategic Influence and Global Stability

If alliances are thus helpful in terms of the conflicts America wages,
they are more helpful still in terms of the conflicts they prevent and
the broader geostrategic influence they confer. Indeed, although the
ultimate test of America’s alliances lies in their efficacy as warfighting
34      See, for instance, “The Japanese Military’s Focus on Anti-Submarine Capabilities,” Stratfor
Worldview, June 24, 2013, https://worldview.stratfor.com/analysis/japanese-militarys-focus-anti
-submarine-abilities.
35      American officials described access to Incirlik, Turkey, as a “game changer” in the counterISIS campaign. Ceylan Yeginsu and Helene Cooper “U.S. Jets to Use Turkish Bases in War on ISIS,”
New York Times, July 23, 2015.
36      On local and regional advantages, see, for instance, Christopher S. Chivvis, The French War on
Al Qa’ida in Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
37      See Sir Stephen Lander, “International Intelligence Cooperation: An Inside Perspective,”
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17, 3 (October 2004): 481–93, doi:10.1080/0955757042000
296964; and Richard J. Aldrich, “U.S.-European Intelligence Co-Operation on Counter-Terrorism:
Low Politics and Compulsion,” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 11, 1 (February
2009): 122–39, doi:10.1111/j.1467-856x.2008.00353.x.
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coalitions, the most powerful benefits they provide come in the normal
course of peacetime geostrategic management and competition.
First, US alliances bind many of the richest and most militarily capable
countries in the world to Washington through enduring relationships of
deep cooperation. Alliances reflect shared interests rather than creating
them, of course, and the United States would presumably have close ties
to countries such as the United Kingdom even without formal alliances.
But alliances nonetheless serve as “hoops of steel.” They help create
a sense of permanence and shared purpose in key relationships; they
provide forums for regular interaction and cooperation; they conduce to
deeply institutionalized exchanges (of intelligence, personnel, and other
assets) that insulate and perpetuate friendly associations even when
political leaders clash.38 And insofar as US alliances serve these purposes
with respect to immensely influential countries in Europe and the
Asia-Pacific, they help Washington preserve a significant overbalance of
power vis-à-vis any competitor.
Second, alliances have a strong deterrent effect on would-be
aggressors. American alliances lay down “redlines” regarding areas
in which territorial aggression is impermissible; they complicate the
calculus of any potential aggressor by raising the strong possibility that
an attack on a US ally will mean a fight with the world’s most formidable
military. The proposition that “defensive alliances deter the initiation of
disputes” is, in fact, supported by empirical evidence, and the forward
deployment of troops strengthens this deterrence further still.39
NATO clearly had an important deterrent effect on Soviet
calculations during the Cold War, for instance; more recently, Russia
has behaved most aggressively toward countries lacking US alliance
guarantees (Georgia and Ukraine), rather than toward those countries
possessing them (the Baltic states or Poland). In other words, alliances
make the geostrategic status quo—which is enormously favorable to the
United States—far “stickier” than it might otherwise be.
Third, and related to this second benefit, alliances tamp down
international instability more broadly. American security guarantees
allow US allies to underbuild their own militaries; while always annoying
and problematic when taken to extremes, this phenomenon also helps
avert the arms races and febrile security competitions that plagued
Europe and East Asia in earlier eras. In fact, US alliances are as useful
in managing tensions among America’s allies as they are in constraining
America’s adversaries.
NATO was always intended to keep the “Americans in” and the
“Germans down” as well as the “Russians out”; US presence, along
with the creation of a framework in which France and Germany were
38      On deep institutionalization, see Celeste A. Wallander, “Institutional Assets and Adaptability:
NATO after the Cold War,” International Organization 54, 5 (Autumn 2000): 705–35; and Aldrich,
“U.S.-European Intelligence Co-Operation.”
39      Jesse C. Johnson and Brett Ashley Leeds, “Defense Pacts: A Prescription for Peace?,” Foreign
Policy Analysis 7, 1 (January 2011): 45–65, esp. 45, doi:10.1111/j.1743-8594.2010.00122.x; Brett
Ashley Leeds, “Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation
of Militarized Interstate Disputes,” American Journal of Political Science 47, 3 (July 2003): 427–39,
doi:10.2307/3186107; Paul K. Huth, “Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War,” American
Political Science Review 82, 2 (June 1988): 423–43, doi:10.2307/1957394; and Vesna Danilovic, “The
Sources of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, 3 (2001):
341–69, doi:10.1177/0022002701045003005.
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incentivized to cooperate rather than compete with one another, would
help stifle any resurgence of tensions between these historical rivals.40
Similarly, US alliance guarantees in the Asia-Pacific were designed, in
part, to create a climate of security in which Japan could be revived
economically without threatening its neighbors, just as the expansion
of NATO after the Cold War helped prevent incipient rivalries and
territorial irredentism among former members of the Warsaw Pact.41
US alliances keep things quiet in regions Washington cannot ignore,
thereby fostering a climate of peace in which America and its partners
can flourish.
Fourth, US alliances impede dangerous geostrategic phenomena
such as nuclear proliferation. As scholars such as Francis Gavin have
emphasized, US security guarantees and forward deployments have
played a critical role in convincing historically insecure, technologically
advanced countries—Germany, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, among
others—to forego possession of the world’s absolute weapon. In several
of these cases, moreover, the United States has used the security leverage
provided by alliance guarantees to dissuade allies from pursuing the
bomb after they had given indications of their intent to start down that
path.42 If, as seems likely, a world with more nuclear powers is likely to
be a more dangerous world in which crises more frequently take on a
nuclear dimension and the risk of nuclear conflict is higher, then the
value of American alliances looms large indeed.
In sum, as the framers of the post-World War II order understood,
phenomena such as massive instability, arms racing, and violence in key
regions would eventually imperil the United States itself.43 Whatever
modest reduction in short-term costs might come from pursuing a “free
hand” or isolationist strategy was thus more than lost by the expense
of fighting and winning a major war to restore order. Accordingly,
America’s peacetime alliance system represents a cheaper, more prudent
alternative for maximizing US influence while also preventing raging
instability by deterring aggression and managing rivalries among friends.
The fact that so many observers seem to have forgotten why, precisely,
America has alliances in the first place is an ironic testament to just how
well the system has succeeded.

Political Legitimacy and Consultation

Beyond their military and geostrategic virtues, alliances provide
important political benefits that facilitate the use of American power
both internationally and with respect to the domestic audience. The chief
political advantage of alliances is enhanced international legitimacy.
40      See Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace; also Timothy P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance:
The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981).
41      The role of NATO’s persistence and expansion in stifling security competition in Europe is,
ironically, acknowledged by one of the alliance’s foremost academic critics. See John J. Mearsheimer,
“Why Is Europe Peaceful Today?,” European Consortium for Political Research Keynote Lecture,
European Political Science 9, 3 (September 2010): 388, doi:10.1057/eps.2010.24.
42      See Gavin, “Strategies of Inhibition”; Gene Gerzhoy, “Alliance Coercion and Nuclear
Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany’s Nuclear Ambitions,” International Security
39, no. 4 (Spring 2015): 91–129, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00198; and Mark Kramer, “Neorealism,
Nuclear Proliferation, and East-Central European Strategies,” in Unipolar Politics: Realism and State
Strategies after the Cold War, ed. Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1999), 385–463.
43      Leffler, Preponderance of Power.
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Formal alliances and the partnership of allies—particularly democratic
allies—in cooperative ventures confer the perceived legitimacy of
multilateral action. This perception is especially important when
an administration is unable to secure the formal legitimacy of a UN
Security Council Resolution authorizing the use of force. In the case
of the Kosovo conflict, for example, being able to conduct the mission
under NATO auspices somewhat mitigated charges of “American
unilateralism.”44 Similarly, the ability of the United States to muster a
coalition of the willing involving both NATO and Asia-Pacific allies
in the Iraq War provided some rebuttal to critics who declaimed the
invasion as a “unilateral” endeavor.
Allied support also enhances the perceived legitimacy of the actions
for domestic audiences, thus strengthening the political foundations for
military ventures.45 The willingness of other states to participate in a
military intervention can signal that the resort to force is a wise and
necessary move, has reasonable prospects for success, and will enjoy
some minimal moral legitimacy. All of these factors can shore up public
support and give the intervention greater political resilience should it
prove more difficult than expected, and this international cooperation
is easier to achieve in the framework of longstanding military alliances.
Finally, allies provide useful input on use of force decisions.
Particularly when the deliberations involve long-standing treaty allies,
US officials can have more honest discussions about difficult policy
choices because the participants are “all in the family.” Put another
way, every US president reserves the right to use force unilaterally when
American interests demand. Yet as presidents have generally understood,
the failure to persuade other partners to approve and to join America
in the effort is itself a powerful cautionary warning.46 The need to make
persuasive arguments to allies and partners is a useful disciplining device
to prevent policy from running off the rails.

Diplomatic Leverage and Cooperation

Beyond their military, geostrategic, and political impact, having
formal military alliances greatly increases the diplomatic leverage US
leaders can bring to bear on thorny international challenges. Formal
alliances and long-standing partnerships give US leaders myriad fora
in which to raise concerns and advocate favored courses of action.
Europeans are obliged to listen to the United States on European issues
because Washington’s leading role in NATO makes it the central player
in European defense; the same dynamic prevails vis-à-vis US allies in
the Asia-Pacific. To give just one concrete example, the United States has
repeatedly prevented the European Union from lifting its arms embargo
on China because of the security leverage it has through NATO.47
44      For an argument stressing the reliance on alternative sources of legitimacy during the
Kosovo crisis, see Robert Kagan, “America’s Crisis of Legitimacy,” Foreign Affairs 83, 2 (March/
April 2004): 74–77.
45      Joseph M. Grieco et al., “Let’s Get a Second Opinion: International Institutions and
American Public Support for War,” International Studies Quarterly 55, no. 2 (June 2011): 563–83,
doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00660.x.
46      For instance, the Bush Administration was stymied on the Sudan by the reluctance of the
rest of the international community to intervene. Condoleeza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of
My Years in Washington (New York: Crown Publishers, 2011), 582–85.
47      See Glenn Kessler, “Rice Warns Europe Not to Sell Advanced Weaponry to China,”
Washington Post, March 21, 2005.
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Having allies also increases US diplomatic options vis-à-vis
adversaries. Here, the danger of entrapment (getting drawn into conflicts
America might otherwise have avoided) must be weighed against
the benefits of having more options in dealing with the adversaries
Washington cannot ignore. One such benefit is the increased range
of signaling options available to strategists during an unfolding crisis.
Consider US efforts to constrain the North Korean nuclear program.
Without military alliances with South Korea and Japan, the United States
would have only two baskets of military options short of actual resort to
force in order to signal resolve and to shape North Korean calculations:
either taking relatively meaningless actions, such as changing the alert
levels in the homeland or in other theaters, or taking relatively dramatic
escalations, such as moving an aircraft carrier battle group within range
of the Korean peninsula or flying sorties close to the North Korean
border. With South Korea and Japan as allies, however, Washington
has a wider variety of midrange actions—increasing missile defense
capability or readiness in theater, raising local alert levels, and so on.48
These steps give leaders ways of responding, and thereby influencing
diplomatic negotiations, while also better positioning America to
respond if diplomacy fails.
Finally, alliances enhance US diplomatic efforts on security issues
beyond those directly related to collective defense. The United States
has used its alliances as vehicles for cooperation on counterterrorism
(both prior to and since September 11, 2001), as well as for countering
cybercrime, proliferation, and piracy; addressing climate change; and
responding to other challenges. All of these efforts involve substantial
intelligence sharing, information pooling, and coordination across law
enforcement and other lines of action. And all of this coordination
is greatly facilitated when conducted through deeply institutionalized
alliances and long-standing cooperative relationships.49
The United States has, of course, also been able to achieve tactical
cooperation even from long-standing adversaries on issues such as
counterterrorism, but such cooperation is frequently less significant,
harder to obtain, and comes at a higher price in terms of the reciprocal
American “gives” required in transactional relationships. It is thus with
good reason that, when an international crisis breaks or a new global
challenge emerges, the first phone calls made by US leaders are usually
to America’s closest allies.

Economic Benefits

As noted, the economic costs of US alliance commitments are lower
than conventionally assumed because the alliances allow Washington to
project military power much more cheaply than otherwise would be the
case. Alliances also generate numerous indirect economic benefits—so
many that they may constitute a net profit center for the United States.
As a recent analysis of the deployment of US troops abroad and of US
treaty obligations shows, both of these forms of security commitments
48      See, for example, the US-South Korean incremental tit-for-tat response to recent North
Korean military provocations, Dan Lamothe, “U.S. Army and South Korean Military Respond to
North Korea’s Launch with Missile Exercise,” Washington Post, July 4, 2017.
49      Art, Grand Strategy, 201–2.
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are correlated with several key economic indicators, including US
bilateral trade and global bilateral trade.50 The more US troops are
deployed to a given country, the greater US bilateral trade is with the
country in question. Furthermore, the effect extends to non-US global
bilateral trade: “Countries with U.S. security commitments conduct
more trade with one another than they would otherwise.” Adding all
the economic costs and benefits of these treaty commitments together
produces the estimate that the alliances offer more than three times as
much gain as they cost.
American alliance commitments advance US economic interests in
other ways, as well. For decades, US diplomats and trade negotiators
have used the security leverage provided by alliance commitments
to extract more favorable terms in bilateral financial and commercial
arrangements. During the Cold War, West Germany made “offset”
payments to the United States—transfers to shore up the sagging US
balance of payments—as a means of preserving the American troop
presence in Europe.51
More recently, American negotiators obtained more favorable
terms in the South Korea-United States trade agreement than the
European Union did in a parallel agreement with Seoul. “Failure would
look like a setback to the political and security relationship,” one US
official noted; this dynamic gave Washington additional negotiating
leverage.”52Additionally, as other scholars have shown, the US willingness
to defend other states and police the global commons reinforces the
willingness of other countries to accept a global order which includes
favorable economic privileges for the United States, such as the dollar
as the primary global reserve currency.53 And, of course, by sustaining a
climate of overall geopolitical stability in which trade and free enterprise
can flourish, alliances bolster American and global prosperity in broader
ways, as well.

Conclusion

The balance sheet on America’s alliances, then, is really not much
of a balance at all. There are costs and dangers associated with US
alliances, and some of these are real enough. But many of those costs
and dangers are exaggerated, blown out of proportion, or rest on a
simple misunderstanding of what the United States would have to do in
the world even if it terminated every one of its alliances. The benefits of
US alliances, conversely, are far more diverse and substantial than critics
tend to acknowledge. In sum, any grand strategy premised on putting
America first should recognize that by creating and sustaining its global
alliance network, America has indeed put itself first for generations.

50      Daniel Egel and Howard Shatz, “Economic Benefits of U.S. Overseas Security Commitments
Appear to Outweigh Costs,” The RAND Blog, September 23, 2016, http://www.rand.org
/blog/2016/09/economic-benefits-of-us-overseas-security-commitments.html.
51      Francis J. Gavin, Gold, Dollars, and Power: The Politics of International Monetary Relations, 1958–
1971 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004).
52      Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, “Don’t Come Home,
America: The Case against Retrenchment,” International Security 37, 3 (Winter 2012/13): 44.
53      G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World
Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012).
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If this is the case, then why have alliances proven to be such
lightning rods for both academic and presidential criticism of late?
Part of the answer lies in the dynamic noted at the outset of this piece.
The dangers and risks inherent in US alliances are mostly obvious and
intuitive, whereas the benefits are often subtler, more indirect, or require
digging deeper into the underlying logic of American internationalism
to understand. Those benefits, moreover, often reside in things that do
not happen—and are thus harder to observe, let alone measure. Yet part
of the answer also undoubtedly lies in the fact that American alliances,
like so much of American foreign policy today, appear to be in danger of
becoming a victim of their own success. The fact that US alliances have
been so effective, for so long, in maximizing US influence and creating
an advantageous international environment has made it all too easy to
take their benefits for granted. It would be a sad irony if the United
States turned away from its alliances, only then to realize just how much
it had squandered.
American alliances do not function perfectly, of course, and today
as at virtually every point since the late 1940s, there are challenges on
the horizon: the relative decline of many key US allies vis-à-vis US
adversaries, the difficulties of prodding partners in Europe and Asia
to do more on defense, the threat posed by coercion and intimidation
meant to change the geopolitical status quo without triggering alliance
redlines. Likewise, reasonable observers can debate what military strategy
the United States should pursue for upholding its alliance commitments
in the Baltic or the western Pacific. But the vexations of addressing
these challenges within the framework of America’s existing alliances
are undoubtedly less than the costs and perils to which the United States
would be exposed without its alliances. Winston Churchill had it right
when he said, “There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies,
and that is fighting without them.” The US policy community would do
well to heed this admonition today.
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